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DISABLED AUTONOMY 
KATHERINE L. MOORE, J.D. 
Disability law is still undertheorized.1 In 2007, Ruth Colker wrote that 
disability law was undertheorized because it conflated “separate” with 
“unequal,” and because disability was largely ignored or poorly understood 
within theories of justice.2 The solution for Colker was to attach the anti-
subordination perspective, which was developed to apply to race and sex, directly 
to disability.3 This Article argues that this transportation from the race and sex 
contexts was a partial solution, but is not sufficient to give full substance to 
disability law theory.  
Concepts from critical race theory and feminist jurisprudence have long 
been simply transported into the disability context, acting as an imperfect 
facsimile. The primary purpose of those concepts was to describe, analyze, and 
remedy problems primarily related to race and gender, not disability. While 
disability law has benefitted to some extent from inclusion in these legal theories, 
many of the unique features and complexities of disability law have been left on 
the table. This Article explores those complexities. Autonomy, usually thought 
of as an uncomplicated social good for other groups, is challenged in disability 
theory by two competing values. The value of anti-subordination is critical 
because it seeks to address, and redress, discrimination, sigma, and stereotyping. 
An anti-subordination perspective gives a voice and supplies resources to people 
with disabilities, and will counsel against choices that support stigma and 
stereotyping. An anti-subordination perspective might seek to limit a right to 
physician-assisted suicide, for example, because of concerns about exploitation 
and the messaging that disabled lives are not worth living. This runs counter to 
an autonomy-focused perspective, which would support the choice to end one’s 
life in the end stages of a terminal disease.  
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 1. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1415 (2007). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1003, 1007-09 (1986). 
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An anti-eliminationism perspective advocates for the preservation of, and 
resources for, disabled lives. This comes to mean that not only are people with 
disabilities valued, but their disability is valued too. Instead of seeking to end 
Autism, for example, an anti-elimination perspective seeks to support Autistics. 
However, an anti-eliminationism perspective might also support the restriction 
of choice, and therefore come into conflict with autonomy, where there is a 
choice that results in the end of a disability. An anti-elimination perspective 
could seek to restrict the ability to selectively terminate pregnancies when a 
disability is found, for example. Anti-eliminationism inherently challenges the 
notion that getting rid of disability is a good thing.  
Parts I, II, and III of this Article describe the values of autonomy, anti-
subordination, and anti-eliminationism in the disability context, and argue that 
these values are each critical components of disability law and theory. Part IV of 
this article provides an overview of some real-world examples where these 
values come into immediate conflict.  
A NOTE ON LANGUAGE 
The term ‘disability’ itself exemplifies some of the tensions described in 
this piece. It is both a big-tent platform and a narrow descriptor. In this article, 
the term ‘disability’ is used fluidly. The legal definition under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act4 is different from that used by the Social Security 
Administration,5 and from the United Nations6 definition; there are assuredly 
more, including those that provide more precision and description.7   
 
 4. “A person who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities, a person who has a history or record of such an impairment, or a person who is perceived 
by others as having such an impairment.” Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) 
(1990). 
 5. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., DISABILITY EVALUATION UNDER SO. SEC., 
https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/general-info.htm. A person who is “not able to 
engage in any substantial gainful activity (SGA) because of a medically-determinable physical or mental 
impairment(s): That is expected to result in death, or that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous 
period of at least 12 months.” Id. 
 6. “Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or 
sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others.” UNITED NATIONS, The UN Convention on Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, Article 1 - Purpose (2012), 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-
disabilities/article-1-purpose.html.  
 7. The CDC identifies disabilities that affect a person’s “Vision, Movement, Thinking, 
Remembering, Learning, Communicating, Hearing, Mental Health, and Social Relationships,” CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Disability and Healthy Overview (last visited Aug. 1 2017) 
www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/disability.html; See also  The World Health Organization 
identifies three dimensions to disability: “1. Impairment in a person’s body structure or function, or mental 
functioning; examples of impairments include loss of a limb, loss of vision or memory loss. 2. Activity 
limitation, such as difficulty seeing, hearing, walking, or problem solving. 3. Participation restrictions in 
normal daily activities, such as working, engaging in social and recreational activities, and obtaining 
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Furthermore, there are language-reclaiming movements within the 
disability community similar to in other social justice movements. For example, 
the use of the word ‘crip’ is similar to that of ‘queer’ in terms of self-definitional 
linguistics.8 The term ‘crip,’ as used by some, is intentionally an inclusive term, 
“representing all disabilities: people with vastly divergent physical and 
psychological differences.”9 On the other hand, ‘people-first’ language (‘person 
with a disability’) is frequently favored,10 while others argue that it unnecessarily 
“separates disability from the person”11 (who therefore advocate the term 
‘disabled person’).  Many Autistics state that they prefer to be called Autistic 
rather than ‘person with Autism’.12 Furthermore, some people who are 
categorized as disabled by society and the law do not self-identify as such: many 
Deaf people advance the notion that they are not disabled, but merely possess a 
trait in common with each other.13  
Throughout, this piece attempts to utilize non-ableist language. Any 
missteps are the author’s own.  
I. THE VALUE OF AUTONOMY 
Autonomy, independence, and freedom of mind and body are centrally 
important to people with disabilities. The traditional philosophical concept of 
autonomy is that it can be framed as ‘self-ownership’. If you ‘own’ your life, the 
choices you make might be tied intimately to your sense of self. 
People with disabilities may experience autonomy and choice – and 
therefore their sense of self – differently than non-disabled people. It is of unique 
concern to people whose autonomy is often taken away. Furthermore, the 
Kantian emphasis on rationality can also be used a weapon to strip certain 
individuals of their own autonomy. 
 
health care and preventive services.” WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Classification of Functioning, 
Disability and Health (ICF) (2001), www.who.int/classifications/icf/en.  
 8. See, e.g., ROBERT MCGRUER, CRIP THEORY: CULTURAL SIGNS OF QUEERNESS AND DISABILITY 
(2006).  
 9. JULIE WILLIAMS, WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY, Crip Theory, www.wright.edu/event/sex-
disability-conference/crip-theory.  
 10. See Kathie Snow, Examples of People First Language, 
https://1.cdn.edl.io/AUiNZe8nGx3v99lSy0wI09mCC6OQDKyj0TUusR3qiD4TJD7n.pdf (giving 
examples of how to use people-first language and phrases instead of disability-first language).  
 11. JULIE WILLIAMS, supra note 9. 
 12. See for example: “I would appreciate it, if I end up in your article, if you describe me as ‘an 
autistic’ or ‘an autistic person,’ versus the ‘person with,”‘ Ms. Dawson wrote in an e-mail message. ‘Just 
like you would feel odd if people said you were a ‘person with femaleness.’” Amy Harmon, How About 
Not ‘Curing’ Us, Some Autistics Are Pleading, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2004).  
 13. See Megan A. Jones, Deafness as Culture: A Psychosocial Perspective, 22(2) DISABILITY 
STUDIES QUARTERLY 51, 51 (2002) (describing the view among “proponents of deafness as a culture” 
who have “asserted that deafness is not a pathology and therefore does not need to be ‘fixed.’”)  
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A. Autonomy as Self-Ownership 
Autonomy is generally seen as a social good, when it doesn’t infringe on 
others.14 Moreover, it is frequently cited as an American value,15 described as a 
“central value underlying the First Amendment’s commitment to free 
expression.”16 Gerald Dworkin for example defines autonomy as “the capacity 
to accept or attempt to change [preferences, desires and wishes] in light of 
higher-order preferences and values. By exercising such a capacity, persons 
define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take 
responsibility for the kind of person they are.”17 So when people exercise 
autonomy, they don’t merely break free of restraint or control; they take 
ownership of their choices and their lives.18 Setting the stage for any discussion 
of the deeper nuances of the human drive for autonomy is not a simple 
proposition. The desire to hold ownership over one’s own life is for some people 
rooted in religion, while perhaps simultaneously constrained by it;19 for some 
natural law dictates such20; and for others, freedom and autonomy must go hand 
in hand.21 Kant writes of the rational will as an autonomous expression of our 
humanity, for when we make moral choices by exercising our autonomy, we 
express our will, and thus we are human.22  
 
 14. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY (1989) 
(discussing the origin of the “modern self”); Robert A. Burt, Self-Determination and the Wrongfulness of 
Death, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 177 (1999).  
 15. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994).  
 16. Id. at 875.  
 17. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988).  
 18. Id.  
 19. See Kathleen M. Boozang, An Intimate Passing: Restoring the Role of Family and Religion in 
Dying, 58 U. PITT.  L. REV. 549 (1997) (arguing for a legal scheme that would respect a family’s religious 
beliefs when making treatment decisions for incapacitated patients).  
 20. Taylor charts this development in Sources of the Self (note 14 supra); John Locke’s labor theory 
of property posits that “every man has a Property in his own Person” and therefore their labor. JOHN 
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE, § 27, 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690). Notable critics of this conception include Oscar Wilde, who noted 
that it “harmed individualism, and obscured it, by confusing a man with what he possesses.” OSCAR 
WILDE, THE SOUL OF MAN UNDER SOCIALISM 13 (The Floating Press 2009) (1891). The question of how 
and where to draw the property lines when discussing the ownership of oneself and one’s life do have 
bearing on disability law, including some of the areas discussed herein. For example, the right to commit 
suicide is discussed infra, with a distinction drawn between when society chooses to focus on suicide 
prevention and when the choice to die is instead accepted or even promoted. Outside the scope of this 
Article, but relevant to the discussion, are the right to hand over decision-making power regarding one’s 
health choices, the extent to which the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) affects 
property rights to genetic testing results, and the use of genetic testing information in disability insurance. 
See Brandon Keim, Genetic Protections Skimp on Privacy, Says Gene Tester, WIRED, May 23, 2008, 
https://www.wired.com/2008/05/genetic-protect/. 
 21. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762).  
 22. Immanuel Kant, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (1781) (writing on freedom as self-
determination and arguiung that individual freedom is achieved through participation in the political 
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A main concern then emerges is the following: what meaning does one’s 
life have, if internal decision-making is co-opted in some way? When choices 
are removed and when options are limited, our life’s meaning and purpose may 
be stunted. Autonomy as a life-affirming value, in that it promotes the individual 
self-determination and expression of will that defines our humanity in some 
ways. Simultaneously, limiting the autonomy of another individual diminishes 
that person’s humanity by disallowing their free expression of will.  
The limits on individual autonomy traditionally arose from social, 
community, and religious pressures in order to avoid taking action.23 This is 
because of the perceived potential harm it may cause to oneself or others.24 There 
may be areas where we may “do just as we please”, there are areas where perhaps 
we “ought” to do something, and there are some areas where we may not do 
anything at all.25 Beyond personal preference, we are limited in what we can do 
and what choices we make.26  
But there are other potential limits on autonomy, and this Article will 
investigate whether the values discussed below of anti-subordination and anti-
eliminationism will rise to a level that justifies that limitation. Going forward, 
this Article will refer to autonomy primarily in the ‘ownership of one’s life’ 
sense, which has implications for one’s life choices,27 and, additionally, by 
extension the idea of ‘ownership’ over one’s choices in reproduction and as to 
one’s children.28 Autonomy’s cousin, self-reliance, will also be discussed as it 
relates to self-definition and disability.  
B. Autonomy as a Central Concern of Disability 
Autonomy is of particular concern to people with disabilities.29 Facing a 
society that limits the ability to participate in employment, activities, social and 
civic life, the “major life activities” referenced by the Americans with 
Disabilities Act30 as well as the minor life activities of everyday living, people 
with disabilities are perhaps uniquely positioned to articulate the human drive 
 
process); See also Paul Guyer, KANT ON FREEDOM, LAW AND HAPPINESS 13 (Brown University Press 
2000) (arguing for the intrinsic value of freedom of choice).  
 23. See Lawrence C. Becker, Crimes Against Autonomy: Gerald Dworkin On The Enforcement of 
Morality, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV 959 (discussing criminal sanctions designed to limit autonomy). 
 24. See id.  
 25. Id. at 960.  
 26. Id.  
 27. See discussion of Sexual Consent and Physician Assisted Suicide, infra Section IV. C.  
 28. See discussion of Prenatal Testing and Anti-Autism rhetoric, infra Section IV. E. 
 29. See DISABILITY RIGHTS CALIFORNIA, PRINCIPLES: PERSONAL AUTONOMY, 
http://www.disabilityrightsca.org/legislature/Principles/102401.htm (last updated Sept. 16, 2017) (stating 
that “[a]ll people, including children, have the right to maintain personhood, bodily integrity, and personal 
autonomy. They also have the right to the services and supports they need to grow, develop naturally, and 
to live fully-integrated lives of quality in their own homes and communities.”). 
 30. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (hereinafter ADA). 
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towards autonomy and away from restraint. This is especially relevant in cases 
where an individual is beholden to someone else’s decision-making about their 
own life.  
The struggle for autonomy for people with disabilities has been a hard-
fought road. It encompasses a history laden with the abuse of vulnerable 
populations in profound ways.31 Accessibility and inclusion within society have 
been historically unavailable to people with disabilities, and abuse, neglect, and 
segregation from mainstream society32 have been commonplace.  
Autonomy over decision-making and a sense of self-ownership are key to 
ensuring that people with disabilities remain present, integrated, and seen in the 
public sphere. People with disabilities must be recognized as valuable to society, 
both as Kantian “ends in themselves”33 and as distinct contributors to diversity 
of thought and experience.34 Autonomy is integral to this conception. As 
described supra, autonomy is an expression of intrinsic humanity.35 This 
manifestation of choice and will is what makes us human.  
Moreover, the history of autonomous self-determination for vulnerable 
groups is a history of oppression.36 Robert Burt traced this history when he wrote 
that, in American history:  
[E]ach act of liberation carried out in the name of the self-
determination ideal - was accompanied by a powerful reaction, a 
powerful oppression directed against some other, more socially 
vulnerable group. This attack was, moreover, specifically directed 
against the imagined capacity, the right, of the members of this group 
to see themselves and be seen as “self- determining selves.” At the 
very moment, that is, that this capacity, this right, was awarded to 
some people, it was withheld from - and even diminished from its 
previous, though tentative, recognition in - other people.37 
Burt argues that the social liberations of one group have been followed by 
increased oppressions against other groups, which falls at the feet of self-
 
 31. See Colker, supra note 1. 
 32. See DISABILITY RIGHTS CALIFORNIA, WHAT WE DO, https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/what-
we-do/strategic-plan (exemplifying organizational goals, initiative, and objectives of Disability Rights 
California to remediate past accessibility and inclusion issues).  
 33. See Immanuel Kant, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41 (Cambridge U. Press 
2012) (1785) (“So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, but 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”). Id.  
 34. See David Bernstein, Some Disabilities Are Actually Quite Good For Society, GOOD April 27, 
2013; See also Elizabeth Barnes, Valuing Disability, Causing Disability 125 ETHICS 88 (2014) (proposing 
the “mere difference” view of disability, arguing against value judgements related to disability as 
contrasted with non-disability, and that people with disabilities would be just as well off as the non-
disabled in a just society). 
 35. Supra notes 20—23 and accompanying text. 
 36. See Burt, supra note 14. 
 37. Id. at 197.  
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determination.38 Burt writes that the self-determination ideal’s dark side is an 
“inherent inclination of this ideal toward harmful inflictions on socially 
vulnerable people, that is, a ‘slippery slope’ toward injustice and 
oppression.”39This ‘dark side’ of autonomy is of concern to people with 
disabilities because it reveals the conflict that occurs when autonomy clashes 
with other values and principles, specifically those values that promote the 
protection or empowerment of vulnerable groups. Finally, as Carlos Ball argues, 
the value of autonomy places a particular responsibility on society to help people 
with disabilities exercise that autonomy.40 “The emphasis that the disability 
rights movement places on deinstitutionalization and independent living shows 
the crucial role that notions of autonomy play in allowing the disabled to lead 
good and fulfilling lives.”41 Therefore, Ball argues, justice demands “a 
requirement that needs be met in a way that provides the individual with as much 
personal autonomy as is possible under the circumstances.”42 Autonomy must 
essentially be maximized.43 
C. The ‘Rational Mind’ as a Tool to Remove Autonomy  
The final piece of the autonomy puzzle is the use of the ‘rational mind’ as 
a tool, or weapon, to remove autonomy from people with disabilities. Here, there 
are two concerns. First, people with certain mental illnesses, Intellectual 
Disability, developmental disabilities, or cognitive functioning limitations may 
not actually be able to make rational decisions under certain criteria, either 
during particular times or throughout their lives. But second, there is a long 
history of discrimination and abuse that has been justified by the assumption that 
people with these disabilities are fundamentally incapable of rational thought, an 
assumption that is based on stigma, fear, and ignorance. If autonomy is centered 
on rationality, people with disabilities will struggle to hold on to their own power 
of choice.  
As discussed supra, Kant writes of the rational will as an autonomous 
expression of our humanity; when we make moral choices by exercising our 
autonomy, we express our will, and thus we are human.44 What, then, when we 
cannot express a rational will? The ability to express rational will can be inhibited 
 
 38. Id. at 201.  
 39. Id. at 201. 
 40. Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, And Disability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 599, 633 (2000). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. . Ball writes generally that “[t]he concept of autonomy places on society a moral obligation 
to assist individuals with disabilities when their basic human functional capabilities are impaired.” Id. at 
599.  
 43. See id.  
 44. Immanuel Kant, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (1781); See also Paul Guyer, KANT ON 
FREEDOM, LAW AND HAPPINESS (Brown University Press 2000) (arguing for the intrinsic value of 
freedom of choice).  
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by mental illness.45 The ability to communicate rational will might be limited by 
constraints on the ability to communicate.46 Intellectual Disability, a 
developmental disability, or cognitive functioning limitation might also interfere 
here, and in particular might interfere with communication of that will.47 In this 
case, the law provides a remedy of sorts in guardianship: the provision of “a legal 
process consisting of a court-appointed relationship between a competent adult 
and a person over the age of eighteen whose dis-ability renders him/her unable 
to make an informed decision or at risk of doing harm to self or others due to an 
inability to manage his/her own affairs.”48 The relationship created by 
guardianship might be troubled or even abusive.49  
Next, the mere assumption that people with certain disabilities cannot make 
rational choices is frequently enough to limit their autonomy. Historically, a 
diagnosis of Intellectual Disability was considered an insurmountable barrier to 
achieving independence and self-sufficiency. As a result, persons with 
 
 45. Take for example psychosis, which “is defined as the experience of loss of contact with reality, 
and is not part of the person’s cultural group belief system or experience.” A person experiencing 
psychosis have delusions or “fixed false beliefs” which “beliefs do not change or modify when the person 
is presented with new ideas or facts. Types of Mental Illness, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, 
www.namica.org/resources/mental-illness/types-mental-illness.  
 46. Id. (noting that when an individual experiences hallucinations, it can be very confusing to 
surrounding family, friends, and caretakers).  
 47. Approximately 1.2 million adults have Intellectual Disability or a developmental disability, or a 
condition that limits cognitive functioning. Matthew W. Brault, U.S. Census Bureau, Americans with 
Disabilities: 2010 Household Economic Studies, 1, 9 (2012), 
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2012/demo/p70-131.pdf. Developmental disability is an 
umbrella term that includes Intellectual Disability, which is characterized by significant limitations in both 
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical skills. 
ROBERT L. SCHALOCK ET AL., AM. ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,  
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 1 (11th ed. 2010) 
(hereinafter “AAIDD”). The cognitive aspect of Intellectual Disability refers to reasoning, planning, 
solving problems, thinking abstractly, comprehending complex ideas, and learning. Adaptive functioning 
refers to a collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that are learned and performed by people 
in their everyday lives. Id.  
Persons with Intellectual Disability have limitations in certain adaptive behaviors that impact conceptual, 
social, or practical functioning. See AAIDD; See also Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders Intellectual Disability Fact Sheet, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Intellectual-
Disability.pdf (hereinafter “DSM-5 Fact Sheet”). Conceptual functioning relates to the ability to 
communicate orally, read, write, reason, learn and retain knowledge and information. Id. Social 
functioning encompasses the ability to have empathy, make social judgments, socialize, interact with 
others and make and retain friendships. Id. Practical functioning may involve the ability to engage in 
personal care, manage money, use transportation, conduct housekeeping activities, maintain a safe 
environment, use the phone and perform other activities of daily living. See e.g. Introduction to 
Intellectual Disability, THE ARC,  https://thearc.org/wp-
content/uploads/forchapters/Introduction%20to%20ID.pdf. 
 48. Future Care Planning, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, www.naminys.org/mental-health-
support/navigating-details/future-care-planning.  
 49. Though outside the scope of this Article, the relationship between a person with a disability and 
a ‘guardian’ raises substantial issues of autonomy and self-direction. 
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intellectual disability faced involuntary institutionalization, forced sterilization 
and segregation from the community. In the landmark decision Olmstead v. L.C. 
ex rel. Zimring, the United States Supreme Court determined that unjustified 
institutional segregation of individuals with intellectual disability constituted 
discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).50 
Following Olmstead, States were no longer allowed to put individuals with 
disabilities in state- run institutions if they were capable of – and consented to – 
being integrated into the community.51 For an example of how decision-making 
and choice have historically been forcibly removed from people with disabilities, 
women with Intellectual Disability were targeted as early subjects of what would 
become a sweeping global eugenics movement that spanned from 1890 to the 
early 1940s, and decades longer in some marginalized communities.52 
The purported goal of the eugenics movement was to create a “superior 
human stock” by eradicating the reproduction of those deemed “unfit.”53 
Eugenicists believed that social problems, such as so-called feeble-mindedness, 
poverty, and unwanted children could be alleviated by controlling social 
breeding.54 Approximately 70,000 women and men were involuntarily sterilized 
in the United States during the eugenics movement.55  
In 1927, the United States Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell sanctioned the 
eugenics movement by upholding a Virginia law that permitted involuntary 
sterilization of people with disabilities when a state institution deemed it in the 
best interest of the resident and society.56 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a 
fervent supporter of eugenics, wrote the opinion for the Court.57 In a decisive 
two-page decision, he determined it was the duty of society to “prevent those 
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind,” and ended the opinion with 
his now infamous words: “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”58 By 
 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (effective July 26, 1990); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 
(1999). 
 51. Olmstead 527 U.S. at 597.  
 52. See, e.g., JAMES W. TRENT JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF MENTAL 
RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 193-194 (1994) (detailing the history of forced sterilization in the 
United States); Lutz Kaelber, Eugenics/Sexual Sterilizations in North Carolina, Eugenics: Compulsory 
Sterilization in 50 American States, https://www.uvm.edu/~lkaelber/eugenics/NC/NC.html (providing 
data on steralizations in North Carolina from 1924 to 1973) (last updated Oct. 30, 2014). 
 53. TRENT, supra note 52, at 136. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Adam Cohen, Fresh Air: The Supreme Court Ruling that led to 70,000 Forced Sterilizations, 
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (March 7, 2016),  http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2016/03/07/469478098/the- supreme-court-ruling-that-led-to-70-000-forced-sterilizations.  
 56. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 206 (1927). 
 57. Id. at 205. 
 58. Id. at 207. 
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1930, more than 30 states had passed involuntary sterilization statutes.59 
Although no longer regarded as defensible law, the United States Supreme Court 
has not yet explicitly overruled Buck v. Bell.60  
Although Buck v. Bell was decided nearly 90 years ago, the biases and 
stereotypes that drove the eugenics movement continue to harm parents with 
Intellectual Disability today.61 As recently as 1994, child welfare agency workers 
told a parent with Intellectual Disability that if she consented to sterilization she 
would get her children back.62 The mother underwent a tubal ligation.63 The child 
welfare agency nonetheless moved forward to recommend the termination of the 
mother’s parental rights.64Furthermore, stigma and discrimination are an fact of 
life for many people with mental disabilities.65 People with mental illness 
frequently face “poverty, homelessness and unemployment due to discrimination 
in the workplace and the benefits system.”66 Stigma and negative attitudes are so 
significant that they prevent people with mental illness from seeking medical 
treatment.67  This is due to both the e prejudice and discrimination.68   
Common misconceptions about mental illness yield three primary models 
of discrimination: “fear and exclusion: persons with severe mental illness should 
be feared and, therefore, be kept out of most communities;” “authoritarianism: 
persons with severe mental illness are irresponsible, so life decisions should be 
made by others;” and “benevolence: persons with severe mental illness are 
childlike and need to be cared for.”69  These misconceptions persist because 
prejudice is “(1) largely invisible, (2) largely socially acceptable, and (3) 
frequently practiced (consciously and unconsciously). “70  
 
 59. Philip R. Reilly, Involuntary Sterilization in the United States: A Surgical Solution, 62 THE Q. 
REV. OF BIOLOGY 153 (1987).  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 63. Id. at 1128. 
 64. Id.  
 65. David Batty, People with Mental Illness Face Widespread Discrimination, THE GUARDIAN, 
(April 28, 2004), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2004/apr/28/equality.mentalhealth. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Claire Henderson et al., Mental Illness Stigma, Help Seeking, and Public Health Programs, 103 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 777 (2013).  
 68. See id.; see also Sara Heath, Understanding Stigma as a Mental Health Access Barrier, PATIENT 
ENGAGEMENT HIT: PATIENT CARE ACCESS NEWS (June 8, 2017), 
https://patientengagementhit.com/news/understanding-stigma-as-a-mental-healthcare-barrier.  
 69. Patrick W. Corrigan and Amy C. Watson, Understanding the Impact of Stigma on People with 
Mental Illness, 1 WORLD PSYCHIATRY at 17 (2002).  
 70. Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good is Bad, What’s Bad is Good, You’ll Find Out When Reach the 
Top, You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything 
More than “Idiot Wind?,” 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 236 (2001). 
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These misconceptions and unconscious beliefs can have profoundly 
harmful effects.71 For example, the child welfare context shows that the freedom 
of an individual to choose when and if to have a child is put in jeopardy for 
people with disabilities.72 There is a longstanding “underlying belief that persons 
with mental disabilities should not reproduce and are inherently unable to 
provide proper parenting to their children.”73 The disturbing history of 
sterilization of disabled people is the extreme outcome of these beliefs, and other 
troubling outcomes persist today.74 Indeed, parents with serious mental illness 
lose custody of their children and have their parental rights terminated at 
disproportionately high rates despite low rates of child abuse.75  However, 
psychotic illness “does not need to interfere with an individual’s ability to be a 
good parent”76 given “well-timed, appropriate, and adequate education and 
resources.”77 The loss of the right to parent serves as just one example of a tragic 
loss of autonomy many people with disabilities face, created by the perfect storm 
of stigma, bias, and fear.78  
II. THE VALUE OF ANTI-SUBORDINATION 
Marginalized groups are subject to overt and covert subordination under the 
law and in society.79 Subordination can take the form of discrimination, stigma, 
stereotyping, exclusion, and oppression.80 The anti-subordination perspective is 
critically important to people with disabilities.81 
 
 71. Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Termination of the 
Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 387 (2000).   
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 387-88, 403-04.   
 74. Id. at 403-04. 
 75. KATHERINE A. JUDGE, Serving Children, Siblings, and Spouses: Understanding the Needs of 
Other Family Members, in HELPING FAMILIES COPE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 161, 164 (Harriet P. Lefley 
ed., 1994).  
 76. Mary V. Seeman, Intervention to Prevent Child Custody Loss in Mothers with Schizophrenia, 
2012 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. AND TREATMENT 1 (2012) 
 77. Id.  
 78. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS 
WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN, (September 27, 2012), 
http://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/89591c1f_384e_4003_a7ee_0a14ed3e11aa.pdf (explaining 
the differences that parents with disabilities are more likely to face, such as removal of their children, 
termination of their parental rights, discrimination is custody, difficulty in accessing assistive reproductive 
technology, and face barriers to adoption) 
 79. See generally Colker, supra note 1 (discussing the subordination of marginalized groups). See 
also Colker, supra note 3 (discussing how people with disabilities are impacted by subordination). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
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A. The General Anti-Subordination Perspective 
Anti-subordination is the idea that groups of people should not be 
subordinated to others in society.82 Further, society’s role in historic 
subordination should be considered when remediating discrepancies in 
treatment.83 Anti-subordination is distinct from anti-differentiation which 
supports policies that seek to treat everyone the same, but in practice 
disadvantage certain groups.84 The anti-subordination principle articulates the 
need for group-specific policies and reforms to redress historic subordination.85 
One example of an anti-subordination based policy is affirmative action, which 
can seek to redress both the historical and present role of discrimination in 
hiring.86 Due to a long history of racial discrimination, group-specific policy 
might be necessary to redress the current effects of that past discrimination.87 In 
addition, the effects of present discrimination might narrow a pool of applicants, 
however affirmative action policies could be enacted to actively seek out group-
specific candidates to address this disparity.88  
In her discussion of the formation of Critical Race Theory, Kimberlé 
Crenshaw describes the way that subordination occurs in law school:  
[t]he wholesale failure to consider the interests of underserved 
communities, the failure to interrogate the gaping contradictions 
between the formal commitment to the rule of law and the realities of 
racial dictatorship through much of the nation’s history, the failure to 
reward innovative legal theories or to explore the reformist potential 
of legal advocacy-all these features of the pre-civil rights elite legal 
education might have been viewed from a position of skepticism given 
their collaborative role in normalizing broad scale societal 
stratification. That “excellence” and “merit” could be attached to legal 
thinking that consistently failed to take up some of the most complex 
legal problems in society was troubling enough during segregation’s 
tenure, but to effortlessly reproduce these values in a post-segregation 
world seemed to undermine rather than enhance the claims of social 
progress.89 
 
 82. Colker, supra note 3, at 1007. 
 83. Id. at 1007-10   
 84. Id. at 1012.  
 85. Id. at 1015. 
 86. Id. at 1047.  
 87. Id. at 1013.  
 88. Id. at 1047.  
 89. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, 20 Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back To Move 
Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1273-74 (2011). 
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Adding to the complexity, taking an anti-subordination perspective with 
respect to one group might come into conflict with that of another group.90 
Intersectional analysis generally seeks to dismantle systems of multiple 
oppressions, “[w]here systems of race, gender, and class domination 
converge.”91 As Kimberlé Crenshaw notes, “identity politics” fails when “it 
frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differences.”92 The ‘disability’ 
grouping exemplifies this entirely – not only is there great diversity in whom is 
disabled, there is also tremendous diversity in what disability is. Disability cuts 
across lines of race, gender, class, etc., but also encompasses a vast array of 
experiences, from physical disability to mental health conditions to neurological 
differences.  
Therefore, within that diversity, it is perhaps inevitable that there will be 
competing goals. Beth Ribet identifies this as ‘disablement,’ and argues that 
“[t]here is, as yet, no sustained critical discourse that acknowledges the collective 
disablement of subordinated populations, and particularly Communities of 
Color, as a figurative, legal, and fully embodied reality in which it is possible to 
acknowledge that people are ‘disabled by White supremacy.’”93 This might 
present a conflict because the disability-rights focus in moving away from a 
medical model of disability might lead to a dismissal of legitimate concerns 
about access to health justice.94 Though not the central concern of this article, 
this complexity is worthy of acknowledgement and further discussion.   
B. Anti-Subordination and Disability 
Anti-subordination is typically associated with racial and gender 
discrimination and oppression.95 However, Ruth Colker and Samuel Bagenstos 
have both applied the idea of anti-subordination to people with disabilities.96 As 
Ruth Colker explains it, “[u]nder the anti-subordination perspective, it is 
inappropriate for certain groups in society to have subordinated status because 
of their lack of power in society as a whole.”97 Furthermore, integration is not 
 
 90. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1246 (1991). 
 91. Id. at 1246.  
 92. Id. at 1242.  
 93. Beth Ribet, Surfacing Disability Through A Critical Race Theoretical Paradigm, 2 GEO. J. L. & 
MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 209, 245 (2010).  
 94. See id. at 245; see also Chandra L. Ford & Collins O. Airhihenbuwa, Critical Race Theory, Race 
Equity, and Public Health: Toward Antiracism Praxis, 100(SUPPL 1) AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH (2010) 
(arguing that structural racism’s influence on health outcomes are not adequately addressed, and that 
“health for all cannot be achieved if structural racisms persists”).  
 95. See e.g., Colker, supra note 3, at 1011, 1013. (arguing for the use of anti-subordination when 
confronted with race and sex issues, especially as it pertains to an equal protection analysis). 
 96. Id. Samuel Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397 (2000). 
 97. Colker, supra note 3, at 1007. 
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the only feature of promoting the dignity of people with disabilities; the value 
for some people of separateness must also be respected.98 This includes 
“disability-only services and institutions that are available to those who need or 
desire them, while also creating safeguards to prevent some people from being 
inappropriately coerced into entering disability-only institutions, particularly 
residential institutions …”99  
Subordination is, in Samuel Bagenstos’s conception, formed from and 
given life by stigma against people with disabilities.100 He writes that there are 
three “means by which society attaches systematic disadvantage to particular 
impairments:” 1. that people with disabilities “constitute an identifiable group of 
people who experience similar, systematic obstacles to participation in a range 
of activities in public and private life”; 2. that “those obstacles result from 
society’s prejudices, stereotyping and neglect”; and 3. that “the very social 
practices that attach systematic disadvantage to particular impairments are what 
create the category of people with disabilities.”101 Bagenstos writes that stigma 
ties these three concepts together; stigma accounts for the historic exclusion of 
people with disabilities from public life and society, but also for the “widespread 
belief in the ability of modern medicine to enhance our mental and physical 
lives,” which means that “the ideological currents that exclude people with 
disabilities from our notion of the ‘norm’ stubbornly remain with us.”102  
Anti-subordination expresses concerns around inclusion in public life, 
access to services, empowerment, and freedom from abuse; it also rejects 
concepts of disability as something to be pitied, as a cause that only needs 
charity.103 Anti-subordination demands that society see people with disabilities 
as individuals and not only as either tragic or inspirational stories.104 This 
perspective also captures the move from the medical model of disability to the 
social model, which moved the focus of ‘solving’ disability off the individual 
and on to the world which frequently fails to accommodate it.105 
 
 98. Colker, supra note 1, at 1418.  
 99. Id. at 1423.  
 100. Bagenstos, supra note 96. 
 101. Id. at 436.  
 102. Id. at 444.  
 103. See id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. The difference between the ‘medical model’ and ‘social model’ of disability is essentially the 
foundation of disability studies – the shift from viewing disability as a problem within the disabled person 
to viewing it as a problem with a society that fails to accommodate that person was the crucial move. 
“Disability Studies . . . stands in sharp contrast to the study of disability which focuses on the person with 
a disability as one with medical, physiological, anatomical, psychological and functional pathologies that 
originate in the body or mind of the person. By contrast, Disability Studies embodies values based on 
viewing the person with a disability not as a victim of pathology, but as one who is limited more by social 
attitudes and environmental barriers than any inherent ‘defect’ or ;deficiency’ within the person that must 
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However, while anti-subordination may provide solutions to some of the 
problems people with disabilities face, the inclusion of disability is clearly an 
afterthought. For example, while “a number of the founders of Critical Race 
Studies (CRS) have articulated a praxis and methodology acutely focused on 
race, and also intently conscious of intersectionality,” it is nonetheless the case 
that “[r]elatively few CRS authors have explicitly taken up the challenge of 
articulating disability in CRS scholarship.”106 Indeed, Ruth Colker wrote about 
anti-subordination as applied to sex and race in 1986,107 and only applied it to 
disability twenty year later.108 
Beth Ribet identifies this problem and argues that disability should be 
brought ‘into the fold’ of critical race theory.109 And, it is true that the historically 
“strong association between disease and deformity and racial images and 
ideologies” is pernicious in that it is used as “evidence of supposed gender, racial, 
cultural or class inferiority.”110 Ribet astutely acknowledges that there is more to 
the intersection of race and disability than just the reinforcing or intensifying of 
stereotypes.111  
However, disability legal studies must go even further than that. Certainly, 
siloed categorization is not the goal here. This Article’s quarrel is not with the 
idea that dissecting intersecting oppressions is worthwhile. Instead, this Article 
argues that anti-subordination is not sufficient to fully understand disability. To 
the extent that disability is theorized, it must be theorized alongside other 
oppressions, but also on its own terms. This is where the next section is germane 
– understanding the anti-eliminationist perspective.  
III. THE VALUE OF ANTI-ELIMINATIONISM 
Anti-eliminationism is the perspective that society should not seek to 
eliminate people with disabilities.112 Then, it goes one step further to assert that 
disability itself should not be eliminated. While we might have moved away from 
the idea that people with disabilities should be removed from society and towards 
 
be remedied.” Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: Whats Disability Studies Got To Do With It Or An Introduction 
To Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 402, 409 (2011). 
 106. Ribet, supra note 93, at 209. 
 107. See Colker, supra note 3.  
 108. Colker, supra note 1, at 1418.  
 109. See Ribet, supra note 93, at 245. 
 110. Id. at 213. 
 111. Id. at 210. 
 112. As used in this article, ‘eliminationism’ is defined as “any set of policies, beliefs, and actions that 
serve to eliminate disability or advocate for its elimination”. See infra note 113 for the source of this 
definition. This is distinct from the definition of eliminationism related to genocide; for that definition, 
see e.g. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault 
on Humanity. Nevertheless, the terms share commonalities; for example, the five tools of eliminationism 
in that context are identified by Goldhagen as transformation through suppression, repression, expulsion, 
prevention of reproduction, and extermination. Id.  
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an integrationist perspective, the idea that disability is inherently bad is still 
prevalent. Anti-eliminationism seeks to preserve dignity, resources, and support 
for people with disabilities, while also acknowledging and celebrating the 
diversity that disability itself brings to society.  
A. Eliminationism: A Particular Problem for People with Disabilities 
Eliminationism,113 for the purposes of this article, is any set of policies, 
beliefs, and actions that serve to eliminate disability or advocate for its 
elimination.114 It is the confluence of factors that combine to reduce the instance 
of disability in society.  
Eliminationism need not be intentionally directed at people with 
disabilities, yet that is how it is often experienced. At its core, it is different from 
subordination both in degree and in kind. Anti-eliminationism activism has life 
and death at stake, but is also frequently pitted against rational justification 
arguments rather than pernicious stereotyping.115  
Within disability-rights groups, there is growing concern about issues of 
eliminationism.116 These groups have taken the position that anti-eliminationism 
must be a central component of their advocacy, because it addresses substantial 
issues that anti-subordination does not: namely, that much of the public sees 
eliminating disability as a ‘good,’117 while many disability rights activists 
disagree.118 While an anti-subordination perspective might seek to raise up 
 
 113. See Melissa McEwan’s use of the term ‘eliminationism’ in the context of fat-hatred, which is the 
first use of the term the author has come across outside of writings on genocide. See Melissa McEwan, 
On Fat Hatred and Eliminationism, SHAKESVILLE (Sept. 2, 2011), 
http://www.shakesville.com/2011/09/on-fat-hatred-and-eliminationism.html (discussing the use of the 
term ‘eliminationism’ in the context of fat-hatred, as opposed to genocide). 
 114. While this argument is not within the scope of this Article, it is readily acknowledged that other 
marginalized groups face existential threats as well. The distinction is that people with disabilities feel 
they are purposefully targeted with the explicit support of society; see infra section IV. C for the discussion 
on physician-assisted suicide and more on this idea. However, an anti-eliminationist critique might tie 
back to critical race theory in the way that anti-subordination theory ties forward to disability. Scholars 
have noted the attack on black lives in similar fashion; see Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography 
and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me In the Legal Academy, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: 
THE CUTTING EDGE 490 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, eds. 2000) for a discussion of the death 
penalty as applied to black defendants as just one example. 
 115. See e.g. discussion of Assisted Suicide in this article for further discussion on the interplay 
between rational justifications and stereotyping arguments. 
 116. See NOT DEAD YET, notdeadyet.org (opposing assisted suicide and euthanasia as “deadly forms 
of discrimination.”), 
 117. See Harlan D. Hahn & Todd L. Belt, Disability Identity and Attitudes Toward Cure in a Sample 
of Disabled Activists, 45 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 453, 461-62 (2004).  
 118. See Not Dead Yet Disability Activists Oppose Assisted Suicide As A Deadly Form of 
Discrimination, NOT DEAD YET, notdeadyet.org/assisted-suicide-talking-points for a discussion, which 
states that “[s]ome people fear disability as a fate worse than death. Proponents of legalized assisted 
suicide are willing to treat lives ended through assisted suicide coercion and abuse as ‘acceptable losses’ 
when balanced against their unwillingness to accept disability or responsibility for their own suicide.” Id.   
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people with disabilities in society, it is ultimately silent on whether disability is, 
or can be, a neutral proposition in a fully accessible world.  
If anti-subordination theory promotes the idea that people with disabilities 
should be actively included in society through deliberate measures and free from 
abuse and stigma, then anti-eliminationism argues that disability should not be 
eradicated entirely from society. This is not just a point about people who 
currently have a disability, although that is part of the argument, it also extends 
to potential people with disabilities.119 This potential is both (1) potential people 
with disabilities, or those who are currently able-bodied, but who may become 
disabled later; and (2) potential people, meaning those people who have not been 
born yet, and who may never be born. Disability is “a natural part of the human 
experience.”120 The range of ways that able-bodied people might suddenly find 
themselves disabled is vast, from accidental injuries resulting in physical 
impairments, to substance use disorders, mental illness, and degenerative 
diseases.  
The idea that we should strive to eliminate disability, however, is in some 
respects founded on the notion that a life with a disability may not be worth 
living, or at least is ‘meaningless’ with a ‘dismal forecast.’121 One formulation 
of this view has been expressed by Harriet McBryde Johnson, a disability rights 
lawyer, who wrote that [those who promote the idea that living with a disability 
is not a life worth living think]: 
it would have been better, all things considered, to have given my 
parents the option of killing the baby I once was, and to let other 
parents kill similar babies as they come along, and thereby avoid the 
suffering that comes with lives like mine… The presence or absence 
of disability doesn’t predict quality of life.122  
In contrast, anti-eliminationism endorses the affirmation of life with 
disabilities, not only as freedom from abuse, but also as affirmatively worthwhile 
in spite of and because of disability.  
Only certain disabilities, or certain groups of people with disabilities, are 
typically ‘targeted’ for removal from society. Which groups are targeted is of 
grave concern, because ‘eliminating’ disability disproportionately harms low-
income people, and people already living with disabilities:  
Persons or families with disabled children have claimed that a policy that 
encourages prebirth genetic deselection of persons with disabilities is a public 
statement that the lives of the disabled are worth less than those of the able-
bodied. In addition, such a policy reduces the number of persons with those 
disabilities, thus reducing their political effectiveness. . . . In short, it engenders 
 
 119. See e.g. infra Section IV.E. 
 120. 42 U.S.C.A § 15001 (A)(1) (WEST. 2000). 
 121. Harriet McBryde Johnson, Unspeakable Conversations, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, (Feb. 16, 2003). 
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or reinforces public perceptions that the disabled should not exist, making 
intolerance and discrimination toward them more likely.123  
If it is true that only a portion of disability can be eliminated, then it may 
be that the people with the least resources will be the most affected. On the other 
side of this issue are health advocates who say that we must strive to make life 
better for all, if we can.124 For some, this could mean the prevention of 
disability.125 There has also been scholarship focused on intentionally creating 
children with disabilities, and whether this is an ethical choice.126 While these 
approaches are not the focus of this article, an anti-eliminationist critique may 
have something to say about parents with disabilities who want to have children 
with their same disability, if such a position is in fact prevalent.127  
B. Filling the Anti-Subordination Gap with Anti-Eliminationism 
The key component that is missing from much of the disability law 
literature is an understanding of the anti-eliminationism perspective. The most 
prolific writing on the issue has been in specific reference to two areas, discussed 
in the Case Studies infra: physician-assisted suicide and reproductive/prenatal 
testing. However, there are other areas that warrant an anti-eliminationism 
analysis, and more that may emerge.128 A more comprehensive understanding 
and analysis of this position is therefore warranted.  
The experience of people with disabilities confronting eliminationism can 
be seen as pitting the drive to live an autonomous life against a message that such 
a life might not be worth living. Nonetheless, the policies that enact 
eliminationist perspectives are usually at least facially neutral, if not intended to 
help people with disabilities. As discussed infra, assisted suicide laws do not 
explicitly state that their goal is to eliminate people with disabilities, even if that 
is how the effect is felt by people with disabilities.129  
As Arlene Kanter identifies, disability studies generally, “infuses the legal 
academy [with] a perspective of those who are routinely made invisible and 
 
 123. John Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B. U. L. REV. 421, 423 (1996).  
 124. See Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability, 60 
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Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 299 (2008).  
 127. See e.g. Darshak M. Sanghavi, Wanting Babies Like Themselves, Some Parents Choose Genetic 
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(detailing parental choices in selecting children with disabilities). The anti-eliminationist perspective 
might be to enhance choice along these lines.  
 128. See infra IV.C. and IV.E.  
 129. See infra Part IV.C. But see Peter Singer, PRACTICAL ETHICS 184 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d 
ed. 1995). The exception to this may be Peter Singer, who has (quite controversially) contended that 
parents may be morally justified in killing some infants at birth who are severely disabled. 
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marginalized, just as feminist legal studies and critical race theory did before it 
for other groups.”130 For Kanter, this means viewing the person with a disability 
“as one who is limited more by social attitudes and environmental barriers than 
any inherent ‘defect’ or ‘deficiency’ within the person that must be remedied.”131 
This article suggests that, even more than that contribution, disability law must 
go further, and take into account the potentially anti-disability forces of 
subordination and eliminationism.  
IV. A CONFLICT OF VALUES   
Autonomy, anti-subordination, and anti-eliminationism are each crucial 
pieces of a well-developed theory of disability law. However, they are often in 
tension. This section will provide concrete examples of those tensions, advocate 
for increased scrutiny in these areas, and propose some preliminary solutions.132  
The first section here will provide examples of eliminationism in the 
context of access to healthcare, in order to illustrate that this problem has yet to 
be solved.133  
Next, the second and third examples involve a person with a disability 
acting autonomously, expressing a wish to exercise autonomy in a manifestly 
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 132. THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL TENSION, NOT FULLY EXPLORED IN THIS ARTICLE, WHICH IS BETWEEN 
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GUARDIANSHIP 55-FEB HOUS. LAW. 26 (2018); LESLIE SALZMAN, USING DOMESTIC LAW TO MOVE 
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REV. 521 (2017).  
As discussed supra in Section I, the emphasis on ‘rationality’ in autonomy can cut out of decision-making 
some people with disabilities who act or think ‘irrationally’. If the law then places another individual in 
charge of decision-making, there is frequently conflict on a number of fronts.  
First, the decisions themselves may be contested: the person with a disability wants one thing, while the 
legal guardian decides to do another. Ideally in this scenario, the guardian is sensitive to a wide array of 
issues such as the nature of that person’s disability and the importance of trying to honor their wishes. 
Inevitably, however, there will be times when a guardian makes a decision with which the person with a 
disability disagrees. What then? What values can the person with a disability appeal to when their 
autonomy is removed?  
The second conflict here is that we can readily imagine scenarios where a guardian might be either 
ignorant, lazy, biased, or actively malicious. When one person has that level of control over the fate of 
another, abuse of power is inevitable, even with legal safeguards in place.  
Finally, the exercise of guardianship procedures might be seen as an eliminationist move, in that the voices 
of people with disabilities will necessarily be diminished. Is there another way to account for, care for, 
and protect people with profound disabilities who truly cannot make necessary decisions?  
These conflicts are unfortunately left unresolved here, as they are outside the scope of this particular 
Article.  
 133. See infra Section IV.A. (detailing the problem of access to health care).  
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concrete way – by choosing to die, or choosing to engage in sexual activity.134 
These examples also have in common that a disability-rights-focused perspective 
may run counter to the manifestation of that autonomy. In the case of sexual 
activity, anti-subordination’s concern with the potential for abuse, exploitation, 
and the difficulty in determining true consent is examined.135 In the case of 
physician-assisted suicide, it is a death that is being faced, and anti-
eliminationism weighs towards at least discouraging that death, if not more136  
Finally, the fourth and fifth examples take a look at actors who make 
decisions on behalf of people with disabilities. These actors, as decision-makers, 
make decisions that can subject people with disabilities to subordination, or 
involve a choice about whether or not to produce a child with a disability. These 
decision-makers may or may not have disabilities themselves, which may affect 
their decision-making. However, the salient disabled person in these cases is the 
object of the decision: the disabled child, or the potential child.137  
A. Problems with Access to Healthcare  
The resistance that some people with disabilities experience when 
attempting to access healthcare fits squarely within an anti-eliminationist 
critique. People with disabilities should be afforded the same access to healthcare 
as others, but are frequently denied it.138  
One example is organ transplantation for people with intellectual and 
developmental disabilities.139 A policy brief published in March 2013 by the 
Autistic Self Advocacy Network (ASAN) identified discriminatory practices 
which deny people with disabilities from receiving necessary organ 
transplants.140 An example given in the brief identifies a woman with Down 
syndrome who was denied a heart and lung transplant by two hospitals.141 One 
 
 134. See infra Section IV.B. and IV.C. (detailing examples of autonomous choice by people with 
disabilities).  
 135. Two other related issues along these dimensions include the controversy within the deaf 
community over cochlear implants for the profoundly deaf, see e.g. Lydia Denworth, Science Gave my 
Son the Gift of Sound, TIME April 25, 2014, especially “A Cure or A Genocide?”, 
https://time.com/76154/deaf-culture-cochlear-implants/, and California law AB 1014, which authorizes 
courts to issue Gun Violence Restraining Orders to remove an otherwise legally-owned gun from an 
individual who exhibits certain behaviors associated with mental illness, 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 872 
(A.B. 1014) (WEST). 
 136. See infra Section IV.C. (detailing choice as imposed on a person with disabilities).  
 137. See infra Section IV.D. and IV.E. 
 138. See e.g. Ari Ne’eman et al., Organ Transplantation and People with I/DD: A Review of Research, 
Policy and Next Steps (March 2013), AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY NETWORK 
http://autisticadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ASAN-Organ-Transplantation-Policy-
Brief_3.18.13.pdf. (describing organ transpalant policies that discriminate against people with certain 
disabilities) 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
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hospital stated that such transplants were categorically inappropriate for people 
with Down syndrome, and the other hospital did not find any medical reason to 
refuse the transplant, but denied her because it concluded that “her condition 
made her unable to follow the complex post-transplantation medical regiment 
that would be required of her.”142  
The problem combines the most pernicious aspects of stigma, stereotyping, 
and bias: the idea that people with disabilities either aren’t ‘worthy’ of life-saving 
transplants or wouldn’t be able to ‘handle’ them anyway.143 This concern is born 
out by a recent letter sent to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ 
Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), signed by 30 members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, which “urged the agency to address what they called 
‘persistent’ organ transplant discrimination.”144  
Indeed, as recently as September 2018, a complaint was lodged with the 
OCR indicating that the University of North Carolina Health Care system denied 
“a person with intellectual disability the opportunity to be placed on a transplant 
list.”145 The complaint alleged that: 
 an individual with an intellectual disability was in need of a heart 
transplant, but a doctor on staff at UNC Health Care determined that they were 
not a good candidate for heart transplant because of their developmental learning 
disabilities and because they do not live independently.  The complainant 
asserted that without the transplant, they would eventually die.146 
B. Consent to Sexual Activity 
Gaining sexual autonomy has long been a struggle for people with 
disabilities.147 People with intellectual disabilities in particular face assumptions 
 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. See also Michelle Diament, Disability No Reason to Deny Organ Transplants, Lawmakers 
Say, DISABILITYSCOOP, (Oct. 24, 2016) (describing an effort by members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives to urge the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to cease the practice of 
discrimination against people with disabilities in organ transplant).  
 144. Diament, supra note 143. 
 145. Shaun Heasley, Feds: Patient with Intellectual Disability Blocked From Organ Transplant List, 
DISABILITY SCOOP (February 18, 2019), http://www.disabilityscoop.com/2019/02/18/feds-blocked-
transplant-list/26055.  
 146. Press Release, HHS Press Office, OCR Resolves Disability Complaint of Individual Who Was 
Denied the Opportunity for Heart Transplant List Placement (February 12, 2019), 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/02/12/ocr-resolves-disability-complaint-individual-who-was-
denied-opportunity-heart-transplant-list.html.  
 147. See generally MICHAEL GILL, ALREADY DOING IT: INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND SEXUAL 
AGENCY (2015). 
A related issue, though not the focus of this paper, is the struggle to gain the autonomy, freedom, and right 
to bear and raise children. The Supreme Court’s decision in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) upheld the 
compulsory sterilization of the ‘unfit,’ including people with (or alleged to have) intellectual disabilities. 
See also Beth Ribet, Surfacing Disability Through A Critical Race Theoretical Paradigm, 2 GEO. J.L. & 
MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 209 (2010) for issues relating to the use of the disability label as a weapon 
  
266 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 22:245 
that they are ‘child-like’ and not desirous of sexual lives, or that they should be 
‘protected from themselves’ if they are.148  One variation of this stereotype is that 
people with intellectual disabilities are “uncontrollably and inappropriately 
sexual.”149 
Adults living with Down syndrome frequently experience these 
assumptions and stereotypes.150 According to the National Down Syndrome 
Society,”[i]n the past, sexuality was not considered an issue for any people with 
Down syndrome because of the inaccurate belief that intellectual disability 
(formerly known as mental retardation) produced permanent childhood. In fact, 
all people with Down syndrome have sexual feelings and intimacy needs.”151
 Moreover, people with Down syndrome struggle to gain acceptance when 
they engage in romantic and sexual relationships.152 In contrast, when 
competency to consent along with an acknowledgement of sexual desire are 
presumed absent, sexual encounters with people with disabilities are 
“automatically assumed to be assault – they have to be proven otherwise in 
criminal and legal mechanisms”.153  
Adding further complexity, ableism in this context is linked to 
heteronormativity.154 Robert McRuer tracks the visibility of disability (or of 
‘crips’ in his terminology) with the visibility of queerness, arguing that the 
 
of sexual oppression. Buck v. Bell has never been overturned; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) 
limited the scope of some compulsory sterilization laws, but did not directly comment on sterilization of 
the disabled. In fact, involuntary sterilization still occurs. As recently as 2014, a 20-year-old man with an 
intellectual disability had to sue to prevent his mother from having a doctor perform an involuntary 
vasectomy on him. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 845 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa, 2014) (holding that Court-approved 
involuntary vasectomies would be acceptable under certain circumstances; it was that the man’s mother 
had neglected to seek a judicial order first that was the problem).  
Furthermore, once a child is born to someone with a disability, there is frequent state intervention to 
discourage or prevent that parenting relationship. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE 
CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN, (September 27, 
2012), http://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/89591c1f_384e_4003_a7ee_0a14ed3e11aa.pdf 
(explaining the differences that parents with disabilities are more likely to face, such as removal of their 
children, termination of their parental rights, discrimination is custody, difficulty in accessing assistive 
reproductive technology, and face barriers to adoption). See also Joint Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Just. 
& Health and Hum. Services To Interim Comm’r Erin Deveney, (Jan. 29, 2015) (describing the bias in 
the Massachusetts child welfare system against parents with disabilities, and asserting that the Americans 
with Disabilities Act applies in the child welfare law context), https://www.ada.gov/ma_docf_lof.pdf.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 30.  
 150. See Sexuality & Down Syndrome, NAT’L DOWN SYNDROME SOC’Y, 
https://www.ndss.org/resources/sexuality/. 
 151. Id.  
 152. See, e.g. Clair Pullen, Couples with Down Syndrome Don’t Need To Be Sterilized, They Need 
Support, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, (October 6, 2016) https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/couples-with-
down-syndrome-dont-need-to-be-sterilised-they-need-support-20161005-grv6no.html (describing two 
adults with Down syndrome whose parents sought to have them forcibly sterilized).  
 153. Gill, supra note 147.  
 154. MCGRUER, supra note 8. 
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system of compulsory of able-bodiedness that produces disability is interwoven 
with and dependent on the system of compulsory heterosexuality that produces 
queerness.155 This system is dependent on able bodies being ‘invisible’ in the 
same way that heterosexuality is: it is the default, the assumption, and not worthy 
of note.156 When disabled bodies are by contrast visible, they are visible for their 
difference, and therefore are seen as having something different about their 
sexuality too.157  
Paternalistic over-protection on the one hand, at the expense of inhibiting 
sexual autonomy, is contrasted with the high risks of exploitation, a concern of 
anti-subordination.158 People with disabilities, and women with disabilities in 
particular, are subject to high rates of sexual abuse; some estimates put the rate 
at 80% of women with intellectual disabilities abused in their lifetime.159 Not 
only are people with disabilities more than twice as likely to be victims of violent 
crime as people without disabilities, people with disabilities are more than three 
times as likely to be the victims of serious violent crime (rape or sexual assault, 
robbery, and aggravated assault) as people without disabilities.160  
Undoubtedly, protection from sexual assault must be a priority, and any 
group sexually assaulted at such an alarming rate urgently needs that protection. 
How to address this problem, “without making the victims symbols of 
humiliation,” while also acknowledging the “social forces such as ableism, 
racism, classism, and sexism that portray women with intellectual disabilities as 
warranting special treatment,”161 is the challenge here.  
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id.  
 158. See id. See also Sexual Assault Within Underserved Populations, THE WASH. COAL. OF SEXUAL 
ASSAULT PROGRAMS, https://www.wcsap.org/help/about-sexual-assault/how-often-does-it-happen (last 
visited April 1, 2019) (providing data on the high risk of sexual assault among people with disabilities, 
particularly people with development disabilities). 
 159. According to some sources, 80% of women and 30% of men with intellectual disabilities have 
been sexually assaulted, and 50% of those women were assaulted more than ten times. Sexual Assault 
Within Underserved Populations, THE WASH. COAL. OF SEXUAL ASSAULT PROGRAMS, 
https://www.wcsap.org/help/about-sexual-assault/how-often-does-it-happen (last visited April 1, 2019); 
DISABILITY JUSTICE, SEXUAL ABUSE https://disabilityjustice.org/sexual-abuse; DISABLED WORLD, 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, https://www.disabled-
world.com/disability/sexuality/assaults.php#ixzz2SXMEQWra. The rates of abuse may also be higher for 
physical disabilities; for example, 54% of boys who are Deaf have been sexually abused, compared to 
10% of boys who are hearing, and 50% of girls who are Deaf have been sexually abused, compared to 
25% of girls who are hearing. See also Patricia Sullivan et al., Sexual Abuse of Deaf Youth, 132 AM ANN 
DEAF 256 (1987).  
 160. Crime Against Persons with Disabilities, 2009-2014 Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 
(2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/capd0914st_sum.pdf. 
 161. Gill, supra note 147, at 23. 
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One proposal is to adjust the concern with consent by centering a concern 
about exploitation.162 H. Matthews defines abuse as based on the presence of 
exploitation – this is helpful “because it moves away from the albeit crucial issue 
of consent and indicates that although a person with learning disabilities may 
have been willing to engage in sexual contact, they may still have been abused, 
because of the position or motivation of the other person.”163 This focus on 
exploitation rather than consent recognizes that there may be an “unequal power 
dynamic” that favors “professionals, family members and staff,” which can lead 
to sexual violence.164 
An exploitation analysis would be an anti-subordination-based response to 
the problem in that it could allow people with intellectual disabilities, for 
example, to engage in romantic and/or sexual relationships without turning them 
into “symbols of humiliation” or seeing them as “warranting special 
treatment.”165  
Take the case of State v. Fourtin, in which Richard Fourtin was accused of 
sexually assaulting a woman with cerebral palsy and hydrocephalus who used a 
wheelchair.166 The decision focused on the consent issue – it appeared to the 
Connecticut Appellate Court that the alleged victim was capable of consent 
because she had a history of “registering displeasure” through “biting, kicking 
and scratching.”167   
If the focus of that decision had been on exploitation - rather than capacity 
to consent - it may have come out differently. Prosecutors argued in the case that 
the alleged victim (referred to as “L.K.”) was “physically helpless.”168 The 
finding of physical helplessness was necessary for Fourtin’s conviction under the 
Connecticut statute for sexual assault in the second and fourth degrees.169 
Physical helplessness is defined as “unconscious or for any other reason… 
physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.”170  
The Connecticut Court was probably correct that under the statute, L.K. did 
not meet the definition of physically helpless171 If she was capable of 
communicating her unwillingness to an act, essentially, she was capable of 
 
 162. Michelle McCarthy & David Thompson, Sexual Abuse by Design: An Examination of the Issues 
in Learning Disability Services, 11 DISABILITY AND SOC’Y 205, 206 (1996). 
 163. Id.  
 164. Gill, supra note 147, at 34. 
 165. Id. .  
 166. State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d. 674 (Conn. 2012) 
 167. Id. at 677;. see also Joseph Fischel & Hilary O’Connell, Disabling Consent, Or Reconstructing 
Sexual Autonomy, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 428, 429 (2016) (describing the Fourtin case and decision). 
 168. Id; Fischel & O’Connell, supra note 167, at 474. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.   
 171. State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d. 674 (Conn. 2012). 
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consent (or, as the case may be, non-consent).172 Perhaps, then, the issue was the 
charging statute; why not prosecute Fourtin under a rape statute without the 
‘physical helplessness’ dimension? There were two other options in the case 
available to prosecutors: The general sexual assault statute, which requires proof 
of physical force, and a sexual assault statute that relates to victims determined 
to be “mentally defective.”173 Since L.K.’s disability rendered it unnecessary to 
use physical force to assault her, the only other option available to prosecutors 
would have been to prove she was ‘mentally defective.’174  
After the case and directly in response to it, 2012 statutory revisions added 
a provision regarding when a victim’s ability to consent is impaired “because of 
mental disability.”175 This also seems unsatisfactory.. If a person were covered 
by this statute it is true that their lack of consent, if present, would be accounted 
for; however, it also removes any possibility for their sexual autonomy, or 
“wanted sexual contact.”176 Perhaps it would not be necessary to remove a 
victim’s agency, her ability to consent, if the law allowed the Court to focus on 
exploitation instead. An affirmative-consent standard might also be helpful by 
allowing the court to inquire as to whether the victim expressed any willingness 
to engage in the sexual encounter; rather than only considering evidence of her 
unwillingness.177  
C. Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Ben Mattlin, in an op-ed for the New York Times about a proposed assisted-
suicide law in Massachusetts, explained the problem:  
I’ve lived so close to death for so long that I know how thin and porous the 
border between coercion and free choice is, how easy it is for someone to 
inadvertently influence you to feel devalued and hopeless – to pressure you ever 
so slightly but decidedly into being ‘reasonable,’ to unburdening others, to 
‘letting go.’178 
 Mattlin, born with spinal muscular atrophy, takes the position of many 
disability rights advocates that “right to die” legislation is fraught with the 
potential for abuse, too wrapped up in the everyday coercion and social pressure 
 
 172. Id.  
 173. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-65(4) (West 2015); See also Fischel & O’Connell, supra note 
169, at 479 (describing  the law at issue in Fourtin). 
 174. Fischel & O’Connell, supra note 167. 
 175. Id. at 480-81.  
 176. Id. at 482.  
 177. Id. at 493. It is worth noting that a focus on exploitation would not necessarily be radical, as much 
of criminal law maintains a mens rea element that looks to what was inside the defendant’s mind at the 
time an act was committed.  
 178. Ben Mattlin, Suicide by Choice? Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES (Oct. 31 2012) 
https://nyti.ms/Y2AI3p.  
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for disabled people to end their lives.179 After all, “Who chooses suicide in a 
vacuum?”180  
What greater expression of truly ‘owning one’s life’ could there be than 
deciding the place and manner of one’s own death? In that sense, suicide is the 
ultimate expression of autonomy. Sylvia Law writes, “the right to choice is 
valuable, however that choice is exercised. The dying patient has lost control of 
most significant aspects of his or her life. The assurances that assisted death is 
an option provides a measure of autonomy and control, however that autonomy 
is exercised.”181 
This notion is contrasted with concerns about coercion based on societal 
stigma and bias.182183 The debate sets up a real problem for assisted suicide laws. 
Robert Burt writes that we should be skeptical of these laws because “we fool 
ourselves if we think that patient control - that the self-determination ideal - is 
an adequate corrective to these abuses. We fool ourselves if we imagine that this 
ideal does not carry its own dark implications.”184 
Physician-assisted suicide is currently legal in California,185 Colorado,186 
Hawaii,187 Maine,188 Oregon,189 Vermont,190 Washington,191 Montana,192 and 
Washington D.C.193 A law is pending in New Jersey194  These statutes195 
typically rely on doctors’ determinations that a person has a terminal illness, and 
a voluntarily expressed wish to receive medication that will end the person’s life.  
 
 179. See generally Id (arguing against assisted-suicide laws from a disability-rights perspective).  
 180. Id. 
 181. Sylvia Law, Physician-Assisted Death: An Essay On Constitutional Rights and Remedies, 55 MD. 
L. REV. 292, 298-99 (1996).  
 182. Samuel Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 425, 426 (2006) 
(“societal stigmas and other social pressures effectively coerce people into making decisions that reflect 
biases against people with disabilities”).  
 183. Robert Burt, Rationality and Injustice in Physician-Assisted Suicide, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
353 (1997).  
 184. Burt, supra note 14.  
 185. END OF LIFE OPTION ACT, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443-444.12.  
 186. Colorado End of Life Options Act, Proposition 106.  
 187. Our Care, Our Choice Act, HRS § 327L-1. 
 188. Maine Death with Dignity Act.  
 189. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. ST. § 127.800.  
 190. Patient Choice at End of Life Act, VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18 §§ 5291-5293 (2019). 
 191. the Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.010-70.245.903 (2019).  
 192. Baxter v. Montana, 354 Mont. 234 (Mont. 2009).  
 193. District of Columbia Death with Dignity Act of 2016 D.C. Law 21-182. 
 194. Assemb. B. 1504, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); the law is pending a court 
challenge. See https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/new-jersey/.  
 195. The majority of the states have passed statutes. The exception is Montana, referenced in note 194, 
where PAS is legal by order of the court.  
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This is of particular concern for people with disabilities, who make up a large 
subset of people requesting access to lethal prescriptions.196  
For example, the Oregon statute provides:   
(1) An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been 
determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be 
suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed 
his or her wish to die, may make a written request for medication for 
the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner 
in accordance with ORS 127.800 to 127.897. 
(2) No person shall qualify under the provisions of ORS 
127.800 to 127.897 solely because of age or disability.197 
While this statute contains a requirement for a referral for counseling 
if the physician determines the patient may have a psychiatric disorder 
or depression causing impaired judgment, there is no requirement for 
any standard depression screening or mental health evaluation.198 
Disability rights groups have argued that people with disabilities, 
particularly those who are identified as ‘terminal,’ are more likely to 
experience feelings of depression, of being a burden, and other mental 
states that might be alleviated with services or other interventions.199 
The opposition to assisted suicide legalization has been framed as an 
effort to “oppose of assisted suicide and euthanasia as deadly forms of 
discrimination.”200  
There is data to support the proposition that these laws may harm people 
with disabilities. One issue is the problematic identification of ‘terminal’ 
patients,201 and Oregon’s data confirms that ‘non-terminal’ people with 
 
 196. Oregon Public Health Division Report: “Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act – 2014,” OR. PUB. 
HEALTH DIV., 
http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Do
cuments/year17.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2019). 
 197. OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT, OR. REVISED STAT. §127.805 S 2.01. 
 198. Id. at 127.825 § 3.03. 
 199. Not Yet Dead Disability Activists Oppose Assisted Suicide As A Deadly Form Of Discrimination, 
NOT YET DEAD, http://notdeadyet.org/assisted-suicide-talking-points (last visited Apr. 8, 2019). 
 200. Id.  
 201. They rely on a prediction of what will be a ‘terminal’ illness by a doctor, which could be flawed. 
E.B. Lamont et al., Some Elements Of Prognosis In Terminal Cancer, ONCOLOGY (HUNTINGTON), 1165-
1170 (1999); M. Maltoni, et al., Clinical Prediction Of Survival Is More Accurate Than The Karnofsky 
Performance Status In Estimating Lifespan Of Terminally-Ill Cancer Patients, EUR. J. OF CANCER, 764-
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For Patient Care And Public Policy, NEW HORIZONS, 56-61 (1997).  
“17 percent of patients [outlived their prognosis] in the Christakis study. This roughly coincides with data 
collected by the National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization, which in 2007 showed that 13 percent 
of hospice patients around the country outlived their six-month prognoses. … When a group of researchers 
looked specifically at patients with three chronic conditions—pulmonary disease, heart failure, and severe 
liver disease—they found that many more people outlived their prognosis than in the Christakis study. 
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disabilities have received lethal prescriptions.202  Ninety one percent of people 
requesting lethal medications in Oregon reportedly made their request due to 
“loss of autonomy” (emphasis added).203 To return to this Article’s main concern, 
‘owning one’s life’ in this context is in direct potential conflict with anti-
eliminationism.  
Solutions to these concerns could be as simple as additional regulatory 
measures.204 According to disability rights advocates, however, this is not 
sufficient.205 For them, only a complete ban on physician-assisted suicide is 
sufficient.206 The dangers of exploitation, coercion, misdiagnosis, and  suicide 
based on depression or feelings of being a burden, are too high.207  
On the other hand, as with many outlawed practices, a ‘ban’ in law means 
unregulated action in practice. If the practice were again illegal, it might 
“continue illicitly and without institutional safeguards.”208 Sylvia Law argues 
that such a ban would parallel pre-legalization abortion, where “abortions were 
performed, but because they were illegal, they were costly, clandestine, and often 
of poor quality.”209 Nevertheless, disability activists say, the risks and problems 
of legalized physician-assisted suicide outweigh the risks and problems of an 
illegal status.210 Moreover, the message that is sent by legal physician-assisted 
 
Fully 70 percent of the 900 patients eligible for hospice care lived longer than six months, according to a 
1999 paper published in the Journal of the American Medical Association.” Nina Shapiro, Terminal 
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example, where necessary; one could imagine a requirement for a depression screening for every person 
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 206. The Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund (DREDF) “opposes the legalization of assisted 
suicide and euthanasia.” The group argues that “[l]egalization is a serious mistake for many reasons that 
are not always immediately apparent. Supporters often focus solely on issues of choice and self-
determination, but actually, legalization would restrict choice and self-determination. . . It is imperative 
to distinguish personal wishes from the significant dangers to society of legalizing assisted suicide as 
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 208. Law, supra note 181, at 310. 
 209. Id. at n. 87. 
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suicide is in some ways just as important for activists: these laws indicate to them 
that the state itself is saying that disabled lives are not worth living.211  
D. Neurodiversity, Anti-Autism, and the Deaf response to cochlear implants 
The next example of the tension between autonomy and anti-subordination 
comes from Autistic activists arguing against what they see as “anti-Autism” 
rhetoric.212 One visible example comes from the anti-vaccination movement, 
which has had as one of its driving forces the now-discredited study linking 
vaccines to Autism.213 The contention has been that parents should choose to 
avoid vaccines in order to protect the health of their children – and avoid 
Autism.214 While the science has seemingly moved on, some parents have not; a 
Pew study found that almost one in ten Americans do not believe vaccines are 
safe,215 and a small internet survey in 2015 found that one in five people aged 
18-29 believe that vaccines cause autism.216  
However, the anti-vaccination movement is  not the only place that anti-
Autism rhetoric is prominent. Some parents’ organizations have compared 
having a child with Autism to having a child stolen from them, or losing a child 
to a deadly disease.217 Part of the problem here,  and perhaps a solution, is 
representation.218 Many Autistics argue that they should be included at every 
level of advocacy and research about autism.  
While it is not clear exactly how many parents may not be vaccinating their 
children due to specific concerns about Autism,219 they do generally have a legal 
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right to make that choice. States generally require that children be vaccinated to 
attend public school, but offer exceptions for medical, religious or philosophical 
reasons, as well as the possibility of private or home schooling.220 If parents make 
this choice due to concerns about Autism, their rhetoric about avoiding Autism 
can be damaging.   
How this rhetoric has impacted people living with Autism (or autistic 
people, as that term is preferred by many221), and how the rhetoric affects the 
choices that parents make as somehow “owners” of the children’s lives, is of 
concern to people with disabilities. Some Autistics argue that talk about finding 
a ‘cure’ for Autism is misguided – the focus should be on conceptualizing autism 
as part of “normal human diversity.”222  
This represents the significant advocacy around ‘neurodiversity’ – a 
movement to promote acceptance of the “range of thought patterns and behaviors 
that characterize autism.”223 One study found that there are significant benefits 
for some Autistics in certain preferred interests224, while some see autism as an 
“opportunity” not a “weakness.”225    
A second example of autonomous actors making decisions on behalf of 
their children comes from an advancement that many see as a positive 
development: cochlear implants. A cochlear implant is a “small, complex 
electronic device that can help to provide a sense of sound to a person who is 
profoundly deaf or severely hard-of-hearing.”226 Deaf and hard-of-hearing 
children as young as 12 months old are approved to use cochlear implants.227  
Parents of profoundly deaf or hard-of-hearing children are tasked with 
making the decision for their children of whether to pursue a cochlear implant or 
not. The implants are most effective for children when they are implanted at a 
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young age, so early decisions can be critical.228 This means that the choice of 
whether or not to accept the implant is often made before the child has an 
opportunity to choose – the decision is made by the parent, who essentially 
determines if the child will be Deaf or not.  
This is a problem for many Deaf people, who argue that making this choice 
on behalf of a child is inappropriate. Cochlear implants have been called an 
“affront to [Deaf] culture.”229 The argument from the Deaf community is that 
there is nothing about deaf individuals that needs to be “fixed.”230 Deaf protesters 
at the “Listening and Spoken Language Symposium” in 2013, which featured 
some affiliations with cochlear implant manufacturers, argued that the use of the 
implants largely stems from “miseducating the parents of Deaf children.”231  
This concept of miseducation – that parents (and potential parents) are 
being influenced by stereotypes and outdated ideas about life with a disability, is 
echoed below in the next section, which discusses parents who make choices 
about whether to birth a child with a disability. 
E. Prenatal Genetic Testing 
During pregnancy, birth parents face a variety of choices. One of those 
choices is whether to engage in prenatal testing for disabilities.232 Currently 
available tests include “amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling, fetal nasal 
bone measurements, nuchal translucency screening, blood tests (e.g. triple/quad 
screens, maternal serum screening, alpha-fetoprotein tests), ultrasounds, urine 
tests, and others.”233 If a potential issue is discovered, the parents face a second 
choice: what to do with that information. Choices such as abortion on the basis 
of the likelihood of the fetus developing a disability are, to say the least, 
controversial.234 Prenatal testing is available that can identify a wide variety of 
potential conditions.235 This section will discuss whether those choices might 
harm people with disabilities from an anti-eliminationism perspective, and 
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whether it is necessary to infringe on autonomy in order to account for that 
perspective.236  
One critique of prenatal testing states that it is “morally problematic, and 
that it is driven by misinformation.”237 Another argues that “[t]he practices of 
genetic and prenatal testing as well as physician-administered euthanasia then 
become potentially eugenic practices within the context of a culture deeply 
intolerant of disability.”238 These critiques are very similar to those of physician-
assisted suicide, discussed infra in Section IV.C.. The key differences here are 
the identities of the autonomous actor and the object of that action. A birth parent 
making a decision regarding whether to terminate a pregnancy on the basis of 
genetic testing is different from a person deciding whether to end their own life, 
but such decision-makers might be subject to similar influences.239 For example, 
genetic counselors may “have a tendency (subtly or not) to urge pregnant women 
to subject their fetuses to prenatal testing and abort fetuses with disabilities.”240  
From an anti-eliminationist perspective, terminating a pregnancy for these 
reasons may signal that people with disabilities are less valued, or resources for 
people with disabilities may be reduced if fewer people have a particular 
disability. Consider the argument referenced in the discussion of subordination, 
infra, that “a policy that encourages prebirth genetic deselection of persons with 
disabilities is a public statement that the lives of the disabled are worth less than 
those of the able-bodied. In addition, such a policy reduces the number of persons 
with those disabilities, thus reducing their political effectiveness. . . . In short, it 
engenders or reinforces public perceptions that the disabled should not exist, 
making intolerance and discrimination toward them more likely.”241  
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The numbers bear this out. For example, in the United States, “an estimated 
67 percent of fetuses with prenatally diagnosed Down syndrome are aborted.”242 
Parents facing the choice may “feel a sense of loss because they no longer dream 
that their child will get married, go to college or start a family of their own one 
day — in other words, that they will not meet the conventional expectations for 
the perfect middle-class life.”243 This is despite evidence that many people with 
Down syndrome do go on to accomplish just those things.244 
On the other hand, perhaps inquiry into the reasons behind any termination 
of pregnancy is disruptive to the right of privacy held by pregnant people.245 The 
threat of anti-choice legislation is a real threat related to subordination on the 
basis of gender, and an anti-eliminationism perspective in one category should 
not be used to support subordination.  
Nevertheless, the anti-eliminationist concern seems to be different here than 
in the assisted-suicide case. For example, it is possible that any forces of coercion 
and misinformation could be more readily corrected here. In the case of suicide, 
as discussed infra, it is one’s own lived experience of, for example, 
discrimination and stigma or loss of autonomy, that may effectively coerce 
someone into taking their own life.246 Here, that is not necessarily the case. 
Although the parent decision-maker in question may or may not have disabilities 
themselves, it may be that more accurate information about the quality of life for 
a child with a particular disability is what is needed. If the critique of prenatal 
testing and selective abortion is based on legacy problems of stigma and 
misinformation, then a re-focusing on, for example, the ways in which children 
with disabilities “can participate in the life of family, school, and community” 
could potentially remedy those concerns.247 
A proposal for more accurate information about the lives of children with 
disabilities would not be out of line with current abortion jurisprudence. Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, for example, recognized that states may take steps “to 
ensure that choice is thoughtful and informed” and may “enact laws to provide a 
reasonable framework for a woman to make a decision that has such a profound 
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and lasting meaning.”248 However, if this argument sounds similar to the 
proposals for giving ‘more information’ to women seeking abortions, which may 
in reality be attempts to limit abortion rights, that is of concern to anyone who 
does not seek to eliminate or restrict abortion rights.249 Furthermore, while 
abortions on the basis of potential disability might impact the lives of poor people 
with disabilities more,250 restrictions on abortion access impact poor women 
more frequently.251 While an anti-eliminationism perspective need not 
necessarily be in conflict with abortion rights, Samuel Bagenstos identifies that 
the disability rights critique could “serve as a model for those who wish to defend 
ever more stringent abortion regulations.”252 This Article has identified these 
tensions, but a resolution that is satisfactory to both abortion rights and disability 
rights may be more elusive.  
The proposal for more information is also consistent with the guidelines of 
the National Society of Genetic Counselors.253 The Society has specifically 
issued guidelines for “communicating a prenatal or postnatal diagnosis of Down 
syndrome,” recommending practices such as delivering a diagnosis in person; 
allowing enough time for questions and planning a follow-up conversation; 
provision of accurate and up-to-date information in a “balanced perspective, 
including both positive aspects and challenges related to Down syndrome”; 
providing the information in a sensitive and caring manner; avoiding value 
judgements such that the information is “bad news”; avoiding outdated or 
offensive terminology, including using person-centric language; and provision 
of outside resources.254  
Despite these guidelines, some parents of children with Down syndrome 
report a much different experience with their doctors.255 A study of parents 
reporting their experiences in learning such diagnoses found that the parents had 
“negative experiences with medical professionals during the diagnosis 
process.”256 The study identified the “importance of these early experiences for 
parents of children with Down syndrome and emphasize[d] providing effective 
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education, resources, and practical information from reliable sources.”257 At least 
some of the concerns of disability rights activists in this area could be 
ameliorated by more education, training, and information on all sides.258 
CONCLUSION 
Because anti-subordination perspectives are typically advanced in order to 
help solve problems related to race, and to an extent gender, they are not 
sufficiently developed for use in the disability context. While disability shares 
many features with other marginalized groups, there are also different 
complexities that are unique. This paper has identified one such complexity, 
namely that autonomy comes into conflict with other values for people with 
disabilities in ways that it does not for other groups. Here is where a central 
problem for people with disabilities is left out of disability law theory. 
Autonomy, in the self-ownership sense, is not necessarily in conflict with anti-
subordination for most groups, but it is in such conflict with disability. And, anti-
eliminationism has now been identified as a uniquely disability-related concern.  
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